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THE T AXMAN ON CAMPUS: How AGGRESSIVE IRS 
INITIATIVES ARE INCREASING AUDIT AND 
COMPLIANCE RISK FOR COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES 
William A. Bailey* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In October 2008, the Internal Revenue Service sent an 
unprecedented 33 page questionnaire to 400 public and private 
colleges and universities requiring answers to detailed, never-
before sought questions regarding the institutions' governance 
practices and tax compliance.! Of the 400 colleges and 
universities that received the questionnaire,2 thirteen did not 
respond to the IRS-those institutions were met with IRS 
audits.3 Of the institutions that completed the questionnaire, 
more than 30 additional colleges and universities were selected 
for an extensive audit examination.4 The IRS reported the 
audits would be focused on abuses regarding unrelated 
business taxable income and executive compensation.5 The 
Service has also reported that it may open up more audit 
examinations for certain colleges and universities that left 
* William A. Bailey, JD, LLM., CPA, Assistant Professor, Central 
Washington University. 
1. Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Exempt Organizations Colleges and 
Universities Compliance Project: Interim Report 1 (2010) [hereinafter Interim Report]. 
The questionnaire's 91 primary questions (along with scores of sub-questions) were 
categoriwd into four areas: organization information, activities, endowment Funds, 
and executive compensation. IRS Form 14018 Compliance Questionnaire: Colleges and 
Universities (2008) [hereinafter College and University Questionnaire]. 
2. The IRS identified 2,402 public and private colleges and universities in the 
population sample of organizations thought to be exempt under l.R.C. §501(c)(3) or 
§115, including 1,752 private institutions and 650 public institutions. Questionnaires 
were sent to 100 large institutions, 100 medium institutions, and 200 small 
institutions. INTERIM RI,PORT, supra note 1, at 2. For category size data, see infra text 
accompanying note 56. 
:3. INTE]{]M REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. Another :n organizations indicated they 
were in some way technically not the type of organization subject to the questionnaire. 
IRS audit teams followed up on those organizations as well. !d. 
1. !d. at 5. 
5. !d. 
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some questions unanswered.6 
In May 2010, the IRS released an interim report analyzing 
much of the data it had received from its College and 
University Questionnaire.7 The report noted that the 
questionnaire was part of a much larger compliance check by 
the IRS into tax-exempt organizations. Indeed, the IRS has 
been extremely active in the exempt organization area over the 
past several years, culminating most notably in a vastly 
reformed IRS Form 990-the annual informational return that 
is required to be filed by most sizable organizations with tax 
exemption under §501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 
including most traditional colleges and universities.S The 
changes in this form have significantly increased higher 
education reporting burdens in recent years. 
The IRS Questionnaire and its resulting IRS Interim 
Report-along with the new reporting requirements under the 
overhauled Form 990-provide significant insight into current 
trends of IRS concern regarding higher education institutions. 
Specifically, the data gathering informs colleges and 
universities where the greatest IRS scrutiny will be spent in 
upcoming years. Correspondingly, the information warns 
colleges and universities where they are most vulnerable to 
IRS audit and compliance risk. 
6. Id. at 3. The recent expansion of activity by the IRS regarding colleges and 
universities is unparalleled. Historically, colleges and universities have avoided 
significant IRS scrutiny for two major reasons: a distracted IRS and a willingly 
compliant higher education system. Throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the IRS 
was concerned with newsworthy abuses surrounding tax shdters, television 
evangelists, and the heyday of corporate mergers & acquisitions. Additionally, the IRS 
historically devoted its limited exempt organi:wtion time and resources for offenses so 
egregious as to put an organizations tax exemption at stake. Because of the inherently 
educational mission of colleges and universities, exemption status was uniquely 
protected-thus, the IRS had little to gain by diverting its resources to investigating 
colleges and universities. In 1992, the IRS finally got around to significant examination 
practices in higher education when it selected seven major universities for audit. Some 
of these audits took more than three years. Information from these audits led to more 
than an estimated 50 colleges and university audits throughout the 1990s. Over that 
decade, the IRS developed some expertise on how colleges and universities work, and 
where the high-dollar tax issues were likely to be found. In recent years, IRS energy 
regarding colleges and universities has been a rapid increase in activity compared to 
that undertaken in previous decades. BERTRAND M. HARlliNG, ,JR., THE TAX LAW OF 
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSI'l'IES 1-3 (3d ed. 2008). 
7. lN'l'ERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at i. 
8. BRUCE R. HOPKINS ET AL., THE NEW FORM 990 1-2 (2009). 
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The term audit risk as used in this article can be thought of 
as the likelihood that the IRS will conduct an audit-a 
burdensome, stressful ordeal that may end in troubling 
consequences (e.g., negative publicity, discovery of non-
compliance with the law, etc.). An organization is best 
protected against audit risk when it avoids being an outlier in 
its periodic filings with the IRS. Compliance risk, on the other 
hand, is the risk that the organization has actually been 
noncompliant with tax law. When the IRS discovers 
noncompliance with tax law as a result of an audit, it may 
assert an array of penalties-typically in the form of fines and 
excise taxes (and, in egregious circumstances, the potential 
revocation of tax exemption status-putting the entire mission 
of the organization at risk). An organization is best protected 
against compliance risk by understanding and meeting tax law 
requirements and seeking competent, expert advice. Of course, 
audit risk leads to compliance risk. 
The purpose of this article is to review recent IRS interest 
in colleges and universities so that higher education 
institutions and their advisors can consider ways to reduce 
audit and compliance risk in the elevated atmosphere of 
scrutiny in years ahead. The reduction of audit and compliance 
risk allows institutions of higher education to continue 
unimpeded in sustaining and maintaining their central 
missions of educating students and research. 
This article investigates shifts in IRS behavior that will 
increase audit and compliance risk at colleges and universities 
for the foreseeable future. It begins in Part II by discussing the 
policies driving the IRS in its strategic focus on tax exempt 
organizations in general and colleges and universities in 
particular-especially in regard to its new governance 
monitoring practices. Part III discusses areas of IRS interest 
specific to colleges and universities as highlighted by the IRS 
Interim Report on higher education, and discusses subject 
matter colleges and universities should consider as they 
prepare for increased IRS scrutiny. Part IV discusses academic 
criticisms of the IRS in its aggressive activity toward 
nonprofits and colleges and universities-specifically concerns 
over increased compliance costs, concerns that the IRS is 
overstepping its statutorily and judicially defined audit 
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authority boundaries, and concerns that the IRS is 
overstepping constitutional bounds by participating in stealth 
preemption. Part V offers a conclusion. 
II. BACKGROUND ON INCREASED ACTIVITY IN NONPROFIT 
SECTOR 
A. Scandals Lead to Calls for Oversight 
Current IRS activity in the nonprofit sector has its roots in 
scandal. The College and University Compliance Project-the 
project that prompted the College and University 
Questionnaire-is part of a larger effort by the IRS to 
dramatically correct perceived management abuses believed to 
have seeped from the for-profit sector into the nonprofit sector.9 
Former Commissioner Everson stated in a 2005 speech that 
three major factors were contributing to emerging problems in 
the tax-exempt sector at the time: "a dramatic increase in the 
size and complexity" of the nonprofit sector, a simultaneous 
decline in IRS resources to administer the tax law, and "lax 
attitudes" in organization governance.lO Commissioner 
Everson's concerns were not without at least anecdotal 
evidence-between 2001 and 2004, scandals emerged at several 
iconic nonprofits including: the United Way, the American Red 
Cross, and the Nature Conservatory.ll Everson's proposed 
means to solve abuse included a focus on transparency, inter-
9. Mark W. Everson, Comm'r of Internal l{evenue, Remarks at the Greater 
Washington Society of CPAs (Dec. 14, 2005) ("[T]he twin cancers of technical 
manipulation and outright abuse that we saw develop some years ago in the profit-
making sector of the economy are now spreading to parts of the non-proflt sector."). 
10. Id. at 4. A fourth factor Commissioner I~verson discussed in his speech at the 
time was "abusive tax avoidance transactions generally, including a number that 
involve tax exempts." 
11. Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21'1 Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 
FLA. TAX REV. 1, 20 (2011). "The concerns about charities [in the flrst half of the 2000s] 
surfaced largely through press reports and are legion: spending of earmarked 
contributions for non-earmarked purposes; excess compensation to organization 
insiders; mission drift-deliberate, or aided hy faulty corporate governance; acceptance 
of property contributions when donors or others are the principal beneflciaries; 
participation in illicit tax shelter transactions; spending for non·charitable purposes; 
accumulations of income; failure to provide charitable services; use of the charitable 
form for non-charitable purposes; questionable investment practices; participation in 
political campaigns; and self-dealing transactions, to name a few." !d. at :3. 
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agency sharing of information, and intermediate sanctions.12 
B. Oversight Leads to Higher Reporting Burdens in Nonprofit 
Sector 
In the mid and late 2000s, the IRS shift to make nonprofits 
more transparent was significant. IRS focus on transparency 
mushroomed into its so-called "governance initiative"-a range 
of actions taken by the IRS that now scrutinize the way tax-
exempt organizations are governed.13 Beginning with the 2008 
tax year, and phased in over three years, the IRS issued a new 
version of IRS Form 990 (the annual informational return for 
most sizeable public charity tax exempt organizations, 
including colleges and universities).14 The changes were the 
form's most significant revisions since 1979.15 Former chair of 
the American Bar Association's Committee on Exempt 
Organizations wrote that "[t]he promulgation of this return is 
one of the most extraordinary developments affecting the 
nonprofit community in recent times;"16 and "[t]he revised 
Form 990 is no mere government form; the issuance of the 
redesigned Form 990 is akin to publication of a mammoth set 
of regulations .... In the context of nonprofit law, there has 
12. Everson, supra note 9, at 12. The blunt instrument of tax-exemption 
revocation has been considered too harsh a penalty in many abusive situations 
involving nonprofits. Everson advocated other means by which to prevent abuse (in 
addition to tax exempt status revocation). For a discussion of intermediate sanctions 
see infra Parts III.i\, lll.C.1. 
13. James .J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS's Nonprofit Corporate 
Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 546-49 (201 0). 
11. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., BACKGROUND PAPER: SUMMARY OF FORM 990 
REDESH1N PROCESS 1 (Aug. 19, 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/publirs-
tege/ summary _form_ 990 _redesign_process. pdf. 
15. /d. For a brief history of the evolution of the Form 990, see James J. 
Fishman, Commentary: The Federalization of Nonprofit Regulation and Its Discontents, 
99 KY. L .• J. 799, 799-tlO:) (2010-11) ("In 1912, the Treasury Department required all 
tax-exempt organizations to file an annual information return, a two-page form that 
covered the 1941 tax year and consisted of three questions, an income statement, and a 
balance sheet .... No one could have imagined from such a modest beginning that 
Form 990 would exponentially expand in page-length and importance to become the 
principal disclosure tool for government oversight of exempt organizations."). For a 
more expanded history of disclosure forms for tax-exempt organizations, see generally 
MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND 
STATE LAW AND REGULATION (2001). 
16. HOPKINS ET AL., supra note 8, at xxi. 
220 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2012 
never been anything like it."17 
The revamped Form 990 requires tax-exempt 
organizations-including colleges and universities-to now 
report a variety of organization practices never before required, 
including significant information about compensation policies, 
independence of board members, conflict of interest policies, 
whistleblower and document retention policies, governing 
board minutes, and investment policies.18 In addition to vast 
new requirements regarding the reporting of governance 
information, the overhauled Form 990 also reqmres 
significantly more information concerning compensation of 
highly paid employees.19 
In general, the reaction by the nonprofit sector to the 
increased reporting requirements has been mixed. In a June 
2009 speech, IRS Tax Exempt and Government Entities 
Commissioner Sarah Ingram admitted as much, noting "[t]he 
tax-exempt sector has had a variety of reactions to our efforts, 
which is to be expected when our community engages in an 
important conversation. Some have welcomed our involvement, 
and some have suggested we mind our own business .... 
Overall the reaction has been cautious."20 
C. IRS Defends its Increasingly Active Role 
Of course, the IRS sees its expanding role as imperative to 
the health of the nonprofit sector. IRS Commissioner Douglas 
Shulman stated in a November 2008 speech: 
I know that [the nonprofit] sector has had its encounters with 
abuse and misuse. The combination of tax-exemption and the 
over $3 trillion of assets held by nonprofits seems too 
17. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS xxxiii (lOth ed. 
2011) ("Despite its size, complexity, and overreaching, this return [the revamped Form 
990] is a work of art .... [T]his return entails considerable lawyering. The revised 
Form 990 is no mere government form; the issuance of the redesigned Form 990 is akin 
to publication of a mammoth set of regulations. Much new 'law' is embedded in this 
return."). 
18. William A. Bailey, Navigating Form 990's Governance Section to Reduce a 
Nonprofit's Risk Exposure, 88 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 4, 6-12 (2012). 
19. See HOPKINS et al., supra note 8, at 89. 
20. Sarah Hall Ingram, IRS Tax Exempt and Gov't Entities Comm'r, Remarks 
before the Georgetown University Law Center Continuing Legal Education (.June 28, 
2009). 
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compelling a prize to resist for some. The IRS has fought hard 
to protect the sector against corruption, and the diversion of 
tax-exemption's public purposes to mere private benefit. We 
will continue to insist that the sector be squeaky clean, and 
that the high ideal of public benefit that underlies tax-
exemption is honored.21 
221 
Intertwining the mission of nonprofit sector protection with 
the monitoring of governance practices, former Comptroller 
General of the United States David Walker explained: "Good 
governance and transparency are essential elements to ensure 
that tax-exempt entities operate with integrity and 
effectiveness in carrying out their missions .... Transparency 
sheds light on entities' practices, which enhances incentives for 
ethical, efficient, and effective operations and facilitates 
oversight by the public and others."22 Former IRS 
Commissioner of Tax Exempt and Government Entities Steven 
Miller additionally explained the intent of the governance 
questions: 
[T]o let the sun shine on governance practices. Let the public 
see how your organization is run [and] what standard of 
conduct you desire and aspire to. . . . We care about 
governance because we believe. . . that a well-governed 
organization is more likely to be compliant with the tax law, 
while poor governance can easily lead to trouble. Good 
governance also allows organizations to self-identify and self-
resolve problems.23 
These statements echo the strongest argument the IRS has 
maintained in broadening its tax compliance mission from tax 
law enforcement to monitoring governance practices-its 
position that a better governed organization is more likely to be 
compliant with tax law.24 The argument may be vulnerable, 
21. Douglas Shulman, Comm'r of Internal Revenue, Remarks before 
Independent Sector (Nov. 10, 2008). 
22. Tax·Exempt Sector: Governance, Transparency, and Oversight Are Critical 
for Maintaining Public Trust: Testimony Before the House Comm 'n On Ways and 
Means, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of 
the U.S.). 
2:3. Steven T. Miller, Comm'r, Tax Exempt and Gov't Entities Div. of the 
Internal Revenue Serv., Remarks at the Western Conference on Exempt Organi?:ations: 
Nonprofit Governance 3 (Nov. 20, 2008) (emphasis added). 
24. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 140. 
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however, as critics have argued that (1) the IRS has 
overreached its audit authority by unprecedentedly going 
beyond the enforcement of actual tax compliance to the realm 
of enforcing the means by which taxpayers perform tax 
compliance, and (2) without congressionally mandated statute, 
the IRS has overreached its constitutional authority under 
principles of preemption. Both criticisms are discussed in Part 
IV below. 
The IRS has clearly seen results from flexing its audit 
power muscle in the area of nonprofit governance. As word 
spread that the IRS would require organizations to report on 
governance procedures beginning in 2008, accounting firm 
Grant Thornton conducted a 2008 survey25 where 652 
nonprofit officers indicated: 
26% created governance policies for the first time in the 
prevwus year 
71% reported having annual meetings to discuss executive 
compensation 
72% had a board or committee review the Form 990 (up from 
40% in the previous year), and 
92% had a written conflict of interest policy (up from 62% 
three years previously). 
Colleges and Universities should be particularly aware of 
the new governance policy and practice issues addressed by the 
Form 990. As many nonprofit organizations are increasingly 
seeking to make their organizations transparent, those that fail 
to implement such procedures are likely to become outliers in a 
stream of IRS data, thereby increasing their risk of IRS audit. 
D. Governance Initiatives Turn Focus to Hospitals & Higher 
Education 
Although the new governance and other reporting burdens 
have been applied across all areas of the nonprofit sector by 
means of the Form 990 Annual Return, the IRS has moved to a 
phase of focusing further scrutiny on specific groups within the 
tax-exempt sector: hospitals and higher education. 
25. Ingram, supra note 20. 
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In May, 2006, questionnaires were sent to more than 500 
nonprofit hospitals. The two principal purposes of the 
questionnaire were to (1) determine "whether and how 
nonprofit hospitals demonstrate their qualification for 
exemption as organizations described in section 501(c)(3) under 
the community benefit standard, and (2) [to] identif[y] how 
hospitals establish executive compensation" so that the IRS 
could end abusively high executive compensation.26 
In February 2009, the IRS issued its Final Report on Tax-
Exempt Hospitals.27 The Service concluded that tax-exempt 
hospitals spent on average 9% of their revenues on community 
benefit expenditures including uncompensated care, medical 
education and training, research, and community programs.28 
The IRS also concluded that "[n]early all hospitals in the study 
reported complying with key elements of the rebuttable 
presumption procedure29 available to establish compensation of 
certain executives and disqualified persons."30 Thus, the IRS 
found substantial compliance with rules relating to reasonable 
compensation throughout the hospital sector, even though 20 of 
the hospitals had been selected for detailed compensation 
audits due to high compensation amounts relative to the size 
and circumstances of the hospital.31 Ultimately, the IRS 
indicated in its final report that compensation practices at the 
20 hospitals audited were found to be reasonable under tax 
law.32 
Following the IRS hospital study, the Service significantly 
revised its Schedule H (Schedule for Tax-Exempt Hospitals)-a 
detailed schedule attached to a nonprofit hospital's Form 990. 
IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman stated: "I'm confident 
26. INTEIWAL REVENUE SERV., HOSPITAL COMPLIANCE PROJECT: INTERIM 
REPOHT 3 (2007). 
27. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS HOSPITAL STUDY 
EXECUTIVE SUMMAIW OF FINAL REPORT 1 (2009). 
28. /d. at 3; INTEHNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (TE/GE) 
HOSPITAL COMPLIANCE I'RO.JF;CT FINAL REPOHT 3 (2009) [hereinafter HOSPITAL FINAL 
REPOWI'j. 
29. See discussion of rebuttable presumption infra Part III.C.4.b. 
:30. HOSPITAL FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 5. 
:31. Press Briefing, Lois Lerner, Dir. of the IRS Exempt Org., on the IRS Report 
on Nonproflt Hosp. 3 (Feb 12, 2009) (on file with the author). 
82. HOSPITAL FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 5. 
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that the new hospital schedule for the Form 990-the Schedule 
H-is the right tool to allow nonprofit hospitals, of all types 
and sizes, to report how they promote the health of their 
communities and to justify their tax exemption.":3:3 It can be 
speculated that, as the IRS revamped a special schedule for 
nonprofit hospitals in the wake of its hospital study, the IRS 
may create a new schedule designed specifically for colleges 
and universities once the Service has completed its study of 
higher education.:34 
The study for hospitals was more rapid and concise than 
the college and university study. Within 6 months of sending 
questionnaires to over 500 hospitals, the IRS sent another 
batch of questionnaires to 400 universities and colleges. The 
focus of IRS inquiry for Colleges and Universities was 
fourfold-the IRS solicited 94 questions (with a myriad of sub 
questions) in areas of (1) organization information, (2) 
activities potentially unrelated to the school's education 
mission (and therefore creating taxable income under the 
unrelated business income rules), (3) endowment funds, and (4) 
executive compensation.:35 Although the IRS issued an interim 
report concerning universities and colleges in May 2010, the 
study is ongoing as the IRS has yet to issue a final report.36 
These developments are discussed in more detail below. 
33. Shulman, supra note 21, at 2. 
31. Grassley Tones Down Endowment Threats, POLITICO (Sept. 10, 2008), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0908/13310.html. '"1 would like to ask [federal 
agencies] to develop a Form 990 schedule for colleges and universities,' Grassley said in 
reference to the form required for tax-exempt and non-profit organizations." He added 
that he wanted a specialized form to require information about 'student populations or 
costs."' Id. 
35. COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 1. 
36. On October 6, 2011, Congressman Charles W. Boustany, Jr., Chairman of 
the Subcomm. of Oversight on the U.S. House Ways and Means Comm., requested an 
update from the IRS on its progress regarding the Final Report. Letter from Suhcomm. 
on Oversight Chairman Charles W. Boustany to Comm'r Douglas H. Shulman (Oct. 6, 
2011), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Tax-
exempt.Oct_6.11_Redacted.pdf. No answer was given by the time of this printing. 
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Ill. AREAS OF INCREASED SCRUTINY & RISK: SUBJECTS EITHER 
FASHIONABLE OR PUNISHABLE BY NON-REVOCATION SANCTIONS 
A. IRS Selection of Issues with Non-Revocation Sanctions 
The four areas of IRS scrutiny in the IRS College and 
University Questionnaire are telling. Traditionally, the IRS 
has focused its resources in the tax-exempt organization sector 
only in areas it thought prudent to use its most blunt and 
effective tool-revocation of tax-exemption.37 As former IRS 
Commission Everson stated, this instrument is in many ways 
too blunt.38 Tax-exemption revocation is often likely to punish 
the entire organization and its beneficiaries for the sins of a 
mere few-the equivalent of killing a mosquito with a cannon. 
Such action can lead to bad publicity for the IRS, severely 
limiting its enforcement capabilities. A better strategy, clearly, 
is for the IRS to cherry-pick areas of concern that allow the 
Service to launch surgical strikes-imposing penalties in a 
way, so to speak, that allows the punishment to fit the crime. 
The areas of IRS scrutiny are apparently aimed at 
circumstances in which the IRS can use finer tools-penalties 
that do not consist of outright tax exemption revocation-to 
punish abuse and enforce tax compliance. This is most clearly 
demonstrated in the compensation area. The IRS has been 
continuously concerned with high compensation among tax-
exempt organizations.39 In 1996, Congress passed the 
:n. CONRAD TEI'I'ELL & RICHARD i\. SIEGAL, AVOIDING INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS 
xiii (1998). 
38. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
:39. See REPORT ON EXEMPT 0IWANIZATIONS EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
COMPLIANCE PIW.JECT-i'ARTS I AND II, at 2 (2007) ("In 2002, final section 4958 
regulations were promulgated. Shortly thereafter, EO created the Intermediate 
Sanctions Committee to coordinate all aspects of interpretation and enforcement of 
section 1958 and the final regulations issued thereunder, including helping identify 
and develop section 4958 issues. In 2001, EO formally implemented the Executive 
Compensation Compliance Initiative, designed to review compensation practices of 
exempt organizations to identify tax administration concerns and potential areas of 
abuse in the exempt sector. The Project, which was managed by the Executive 
Compensation Compliance Initiative Team, included education and outreach 
components complemented by an examination program focusing on executive 
compensation paid by a broad range of public charities, as well as private 
foundations."). 
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intermediate sanction rules under IRC §4958. 40 These rules 
provide that, instead of draconianly revoking an entity's tax-
exempt status in cases of certain types of private inurement, 
certain private inurement occurrences called "excess benefit 
transactions" would impose excise taxes on an individual 
benefiting improperly from the transaction.41 For example, if 
an executive received unreasonably high compensation, the 
portion of the compensation that was excessive is (1) taxed with 
an excise tax and (2) the excess amount of compensation would 
be mandatorily returned to the nonprofit organization.42 Thus, 
the sanctions focus on punishing the bad actor who receives 
private inurement, instead of punishing the entire organization 
by revoking its tax exemption status. 43 
In addition to intermediate sanctions, the IRS can also 
require tax-exempt organizations like colleges and universities 
to pay higher taxes if they are underreporting taxable 
unrelated business income.44 The unrelated business income 
("UBI") rules were enacted by Congress in 1950 with two 
policies in mind: First, to discipline tax-exempt organizations 
that conducted business activities unrelated to the 
organization's exempt purpose (this would otherwise violate 
the public benefit doctrine thereby putting the organization's 
tax exemption at risk).45 Second, to place nonprofit 
organizations engaging in for-profit business activity on a level 
playing field with for-profit businesses engaged in the same 
activity.46 The solution was to impose excise taxes on UBI. UBI 
40. See also Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(l )(ii). 
11. IRC §4958(c). For detailed background on the Intermediate Sanctions rules 
under IRC §4958, see generally TEITELL & SIEGAL, supra note ::l7. 
42. The excise tax is 25% of the excess benefit. For organizations that do not 
report the improper transactions before the IRS finds them, the excise tax rate is 200'% 
of the excess benefit. IRC §4958(a)-(b). 
43. The IRS has reserved the right to revoke tax exemption of the entire 
organization in cases of multiple or extremely severe cases of excess benefit 
transactions. See Caracci. v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. ::379, 411-17 (2002) (rev'd on other 
grounds 456 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2006). "Although the imposition of section 4958 excise 
taxes as a result of an excess benefit transaction does not preclude revocation of the 
organization's tax-exempt status, the legislative history indicates that both a 
revocation and the imposition of intermediate sanctions will be an unusual case." 
Caracci, 118 T.C. at 417. 
44. See HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 634-:n. 
45. ld. 
46. ld. See also HARDING, supra note 6, at 10. 
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and the associated excise tax are reported annually on an 
organization's Form 990-T Exempt Organization Business 
Income Tax Return. 4 7 
Colleges and Universities may typically engage in a variety 
of activities that are potentially subject to tax under the UBI 
rules; including bookstore operations; advertising income; 
restaurant operations; operations of parking lots; the sale, 
rental, or exchange of mailing lists; concession sales; etc. 48 It is 
apparent from the College and University Questionnaire that 
the IRS is concerned with the underreporting of UBI activities 
on Form 990-T. This concern is likely a product of IRS 
aspirations to both increase revenue and preserve fairness. 
Many colleges and universities reported that they had never 
filed a Form 990-T,49 so the IRS presumably wants to ensure it 
is not leaving revenue on the table from colleges and 
universities that do not understand their UBI obligations. In 
regard to fairness, if some institutions are taxed on their 
correctly reported UBI, while other institutions fail to report 
UBI activities due to their failure to follow the rules, then the 
tax burden is unjustly shifted to organizations that correctly 
obey the law. 
With the ability to assess excise taxes on excess benefit 
transactions and unrelated business income, the IRS has 
surgical weapons in its possession that it can use to both 
increase treasury revenue and bring organizations into 
compliance without overplaying their hand with the threat of 
tax exemption revocation. In addition to these sanctions, the 
IRS appears to be looking forward to other areas in which they 
may extend their oversight under the cover of potentially 
popular support: governance and endowment funds. 
B. IRS Selection of Issues with Certain Popular Support 
Although there are not specific sanctions in the areas of 
nonprofit governance and endowment fund management at the 
present time, there has been significant popular, political, and 
17. INTERNAL REVENUE SE!W .• 2010 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990-T: EXEMPT 
OIWANIZATION BUSINESS INCOME TAX RETURN 2. 
48. HARDING. supra notp 6, at 49. 
19. INTERIM REPORT, supra notP 1, at 2. 
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scholarly discussion on the issues. The new governance 
reporting requirements discussed above are the progeny of 
popular calls for governance oversight in the wake of for-profit 
and nonprofit scandal in the early 2000s.50 Questions on the 
College and University Questionnaire include areas such as 
student faculty ratio, tuition rates and discounts, and distance 
learning activities-questions that appear entirely unrelated to 
the tax compliance mission of the IRS (i.e., no tax statutes 
require the IRS to collect information about student/faculty 
ratios, or even governance for that matter). It is difficult not to 
infer a political motive on the part of the IRS in this line of 
questioning and information gathering, as no direct link to tax 
law compliance appears forthcoming. 
Additionally, endowment funds have been highly politicized 
in recent years.51 During the mid-2000s, total endowment 
assets at U.S. higher education institutions almost doubled in 
size-from $220 billion in 2003 to $432 billion in 2007.52 As 
tuition rates increased during those years, critics charged 
universities with hoarding their wealth instead of using their 
assets to benefit students. Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) 
spearheaded the charge suggesting "colleges with big 
endowments [should] be required to pay out funds and dedicate 
some of those funds to keep tuition costs in check for working 
families."53 The IRS questionnaire was created and distributed 
at the peak of university endowment discussion; however, 
much of the fervor surrounding university endowments cooled 
down in the wake of the recent recession. In 2009 alone, 
university endowments suffered average losses of 18.7% of 
their value.54 It remains important for colleges and universities 
to prepare for the implications of IRS interest in this area, 
however, as at least one commentator-discussed below-
50. See Fishman, supra note 13, at 516-19, 561-78. 
51. Alexander M. Wolf, Note, The Problems With Payouts: Assessing the Proposal 
for a Mandatory Distribution Requirement for University Endowments, 18 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 591, 596 (2011) (citing Report Card on Tax Exemptions and Incentives for 
Higher Education: Pass, Fail, or Need Improvement?: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate 
Comm 'non Fin., 109th Cong. 2 (2006)). 
52. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GA0-1 0-393, Postsecondary Education 10 
(2010). 
53. Wolf, supra note 51, at 598. 
54. Jd. at 593-91. 
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soundly predicts the issue will resurface in future years as the 
economy recovers.55 
C. Areas of Increased Scrutiny 
The 2010 Interim Report on Colleges and Universities 
preliminarily analyzed specific data regarding (1) organization 
and governance, (2) activities subject to unrelated business 
income, (3) endowment funds, and ( 4) compensation for high 
ranking officials. In its Interim Report, the IRS classified much 
of its gathered data into categories of schools based on student 
body size: large (more than 15,000 students), medium (10,000 
to 15,000 students), and small (under 10,000 students).56 
Highlights of the data in each area are discussed below. 
1. Organization and governance 
The questions in the Organization and Governance section 
of the College and University Questionnaire included the 
following topics: asking institutions about their number of 
students and student/faculty ratio, published tuition rates and 
discounts offered on tuition, whether the institution had a 
written conflict of interest policy for its top management 
officials and whether such a policy applied to full-time faculty 
as well, questions about financial statements, whether the 
institution conducted distance learning activities, questions 
about its foreign activities, compensation for the five highest 
employees (and whether those individuals are faculty, 
department heads, administrators, investment managers, or 
sports coaches), a list of any and all related entities of the 
institution, and whether the institution had written policies 
regarding a variety of listed transactions with related and 
unrelated parties.57 
While some of these questions are now asked each year on 
the new form 99058-such as financial information (e.g., 
revenue, expenses, assets, and liabilities), conflict of interest 
55. /d. at 592. 
56. INTEmM REPOJrl', supra note 1, at 2. 
57. COLLEm; AND UNIVERSITY Qm;STIONNAJRE, supra note 1, at 2-6. 
58. It should be noted that the questionnaire was submitted before the new 
Form 990 was introduced. 
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policies for management, and related entities-other questions 
such as those regarding student/faculty ratios,59 tuition 
rates,60 distance education,61 and internal policies applying to 
faculty appear to have no basis in tax compliance statutes and 
are not reported annually. The IRS asserted in its interim 
report, however, that organizations that left specific questions 
unanswered in the College and University Questionnaire were 
subject to follow-up audit procedures or full-blown audits.62 
Some of the disparities in the data resulting from the 
questions are noteworthy, and undoubtedly have been 
examined closely by the IRS. While 100% of large private 
colleges and universities reported having a written conflict of 
interest policy, only 58% of small private colleges and 
universities reported having written conflict of interest 
policies.63 Additionally, while 97% of large public and private 
colleges and universities made their Audited Financial 
Statements available to the public, only 76% of small private 
colleges and universities made their Audited Financial 
Statements available to the public.64 The data suggests the IRS 
may be concerned that smaller colleges and universities do not 
have sufficient controls in place to prevent abuses associated 
with conflicts of interest and lack of public oversight that can 
lead to self-dealing, excessive compensation, questionable 
investment practices, and uses of the charitable cloak for non-
charitable purposes. 
Additionally, the IRS noted that, of colleges and 
universities that reported having one or more controlled 
organizations, only 29%, 45%, and 26% of small, medium, and 
large institutions, respectively, reported receiving income from 
59. Median faculty ratios were for institutions based on size were: small: 12:1; 
medium: 17: 1; large: 18:1. lNTERTM REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. 
60. Median in-state tuition rates for public and private notably decreased as the 
size of institutions increased: small: $14,000; medium: $6,000; large: $5,600. Median 
out-of-state tuition rates for public and private intuitions did not see the same trend, 
although out-of-state tuition was notably higher than in-state tuition for large 
institutions: small: $14,700; medium: $12,900; large: $15,300. /d. at 12. 
61. Institutions that conducted distance learning activities based on size where: 
small: 54%; medium: 96%; large 99%. ld. at 16. 
62. ld. at 3. 
63. ld. at 12. 
64. ld. 
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any controlled organizations.65 The IRS stated in its report 
that although there may be cases where institutions would not 
have reportable income from controlled entities, the small ratio 
of reported income suggested to the IRS that the 
"inconsistency" would be subject to further review.66 Here, the 
IRS appears to be concerned with potential abuses related to 
subsidiary entities, such as off-balance sheet accounting, 
underrepresentation of compensation paid to management and 
directors, and underreporting of unrelated business income 
that should flow to and potentially be taxed at the parent 
organization. 
Another important observation by the IRS was in regard to 
organizations without written policies in place that governed 
transactions with controlled entities. The IRS noted that, 
among small and medium colleges and universities, there were 
a large number of schools that had controlled entities but did 
not have written policies in place in regard to dealings with 
those controlled entities.67 This observation implies the IRS 
will cast more scrutiny in the future on transactions between 
small and medium colleges and universities and the 
organizations they control.6S 
A final observation in the organization and governance area 
is the data concerning the requested list of five highest paid 
non -officers/directors/trustees/key employees ("non -0 DTKEs"). 
For large institutions, 43% reported a sports coach as their 
highest paid non-ODTKE, followed by 34% reporting a faculty 
member as their next highest paid non-ODTKE.69 For medium 
institutions, 49% reported a faculty member as their highest 
paid non-ODTKE, followed by 16% reporting a faculty member 
65. ld. at 19. 
66. ld. 
67. ld. at 21. 
68. While the IRS was not explicit in its purpose to note the lack of college and 
university policy regarding controlled entities, it can be presumed the IRS is concerned 
about issues such as expense allocation, reimbursement policies, and potential 
unrelated business revenue flows between controlling and controlled organizations-all 
of which can impact Form 990 accounting reporting generally, and unrelated business 
income tax liability amounts specifically. For further background on the various issues 
regarding tax-exempt organizations and their related parties, see HOPKINS, supra note 
17, at 912-15. 
69. INTEIUM REPORT, supra note 1, at 51. 
232 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2012 
as their next highest paid non-ODTKE.70 For small institutions 
55% reported a faculty member as their highest paid non-
ODTKE, followed by 19% reporting an administrator as their 
next highest paid non-ODTKE. 71 For large institutions, the 
data indicates that, at the very least, the IRS may be setting 
the groundwork for scrutinization into compensation packages 
of coaches at large universities (assuming the political will to 
investigate such compensation eventually surfaces). 
One of the best ways to reduce audit risk is to avoid 
becoming an outlier. As colleges and universities review the 
IRS responses within the interim report, and compare 
themselves with their peers, they can seek to avoid being an 
outlying data point and better insulate themselves from audit 
risk and potentially, inadvertently attracting the curiosity of 
the IRS. 
2. Activities subject to unrelated business income 
It is apparent from the second section of the IRS 
questionnaire that the Service is concerned with the 
underreporting of UBI activities on Form 990-T. As discussed 
above, this concern is likely a product of IRS aspirations to 
both increase revenue and preserve fairness. Many colleges and 
universities reported that they had never filed a Form 990-T, 
including 4% of large universities, 29% of medium universities, 
and 48% of small universities. 72 The IRS clearly understands 
that as it-and, on a larger scale, organizations themselves-
finds more unrelated business activities subject to tax, treasury 
revenues will correspondingly increase. Another goal the IRS 
implicitly highlights in its College and University 
Questionnaire is fairness. The UBI rules are relatively 
complex. If some institutions are taxed on their correctly 
reported UBI, while other institutions fail to report UBI 
activity, then the organizations actually following the rules will 
pay more than their fair share of tax. 
In the second section of the IRS Questionnaire, the IRS 
solicited information on 4 7 activities that colleges and 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 27. 
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universities might engage in that can result in unrelated 
business income. n In addition to reporting whether the college 
or university participated in these activities, the organization 
also was required to answer multiple sub-questions regarding 
each reported activity, including: whether income from the 
activity was completely, partially, or not at all considered 
unrelated business income; whether income from such 
activities was debt financed; whether a third-party managed or 
operated the activity; whether the activity created a loss in 3 of 
the prior 5 years; whether the costs of each activity exceeded 
$50,000 paid to non §501(c)(3) affiliates; and whether the 
college or university expected the activity to yield future 
profits.74 
Under IRC §512, three elements are required for an activity 
to be treated as an unrelated business activity: the activity 
must be (1) a trade or business, (2) regularly carried on, and (3) 
not substantially related to the college or university's exempt 
educational purpose. 75 The trade or business requirement is 
typically interpreted quite expansively such that it is atypical 
for any profit-making activity to be considered a non-trade or 
business activity. 76 In determining whether an activity is 
regularly carried on, the IRS looks to the "frequency and 
continuity" of the activity.77 The sliding scale and complexity of 
the frequency and continuity standard cause the rules in this 
area to continuously evolve. 
Regarding the "not substantially related element," 
Bertrand M. Harding, Jr. writes that: 
The taxation of nonprofit organizations is replete with 
subjective facts and circumstances tests, but none perhaps so 
difficult to apply as that used in determining whether an 
activity is 'substantially related' to the purposes for which the 
organization's tax exemption was granted. The regulations 
provide that an activity will be related only if there is a 
'causal relationship' between it and the organization's exempt 
purposes and will be substantially related only if the causal 
73. COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 1, at 8·13. 
71. ld. 
75. See me§§ 512(a)(l) and 513(a). 
76. HARDING, supra note 6, at 11. 
77. Jd. at 15. 
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relationship is a substantial one and 'contributes importantly' 
to the conduct of the exempt purposes. 78 
The nebulous standards in this area promise both more 
guidance and more litigation. In addition to the three prong 
element test under §512 for unrelated business activities, the 
Internal Revenue Code has many statutory exceptions that 
shield certain types of UBI from being taxed. Some of the major 
exceptions include capital gain transactions; certain types of 
interest, dividend, rental, and royalty income; distribution of 
low-cost articles; certain research activities; certain volunteer 
activities; and activities that fall under a "convenience 
exception."79 
Needless to say, the transactions that give rise to UBI are 
many and the UBI rules are complex. The most notable point 
the IRS made in its Interim Report is that more than 60% of 
colleges and universities "did not rely on advice from 
independent accountants or counsel for any of these 
determinations concerning unrelated business income."80 It can 
be presumed that the IRS sees this as an area where colleges 
and universities are under-informed; thus, it may be presumed 
the IRS is highly likely to amplify its scrutiny of transactions 
in the UBI area in future years. 
3. Endowment funds 
According to the IRS, seven of the top ten largest nonprofit 
organizations in 2007 were universities or related 
universities.81 Much of the wealth of these higher education 
78. /d. at 16 (explaining Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2)). 
79. See generally HARDING, supra note 6, at 18<36. For example, gains and losses 
from the sale, exchange, or other disposition of property are excluded from the 
computation of a college or university's unrelated business income. Most types of 
interest and dividends are excluded from UBI, unless the interest or dividend income is 
received from a controlled corporation or debt-financed interest income. The rental 
income rules are more complex-interest and dividend income, and rental income 
received from a controlled corporation or from debt-financed property is subject to UBI 
tax. Royalties as UBI have been the subject of continual litigation between the IRS and 
tax-exempt organizations and the rules as to UBI treatment continue to evolve. /d. 
80. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 33. 
81. They are in order: 1. President & Fellows of Harvard College ($6:l.3 billion); 
2. Yale University ($30.8 billion); a. Stanford University ($26.7 billion); 4. Howard 
Hughes Medical Institute ($21.6 billion); 5. Kaiser Foundation hospitals ($16.5 billion); 
6. Princeton University ($18.4 billion); 7. Harvard Management Private Equity Corp. 
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institutions comes from their endowments. An endowment is 
basically a reserve fund. Harvard has the largest university 
endowment ($27.6 billion), followed by Yale ($16. 7 billion) and 
Princeton ($14.4 billion). In 2010, there were 62 universities 
with endowments exceeding $1 billion, and 128 universities 
exceeding $500 million.S2 
a. Endowments enter the public discourse 
As has been discussed above, total endowment assets at 
U.S. higher education institutions almost doubled in size from 
$220 billion in 2003 to $432 billion in 2007.83 But even as 
endowments grew, so did college tuition rates. The correlation 
caused commentators to criticize universities for "hoarding" 
their wealth at the purported expense of poor and middleclass 
students.84 Critics were concerned that universities-
beneficiaries of public tax benefits-were more concerned about 
growing wealth, then spending their investment earnings on 
operations and student aid. In September 2007, the Senate 
Committee on Finance held hearings that included the topic of 
university endowments.85 
Political discussion culminated in proposals to enact a 5% 
mandatory payout each year by large university endowment 
(11.9 billion); 8. Massachusetts Institute of Technology ($15.1 billion); 9. The Common 
Fund for Nonprofits ($12.5 billion); and 10. Columbia University ($11.7 billion). 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME: CHARITIES AND OTHER EXEMPT 
ORCAN!ZATIONS (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/O 7 eocharitiessna p. pdf. 
82. NA'l''L Ass'N OF COLLS. AND UNTVS. BUS. OFFICERS AND COMMONFUND 
INSTITUTE, U.S. AND CANADIAN INS'l'l'l'UT!ONS LISTED RY FISCAL YEAH 2010 
ENDOWMENT MARKET VALUE ANIJ PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN ENDOWMENT MARKET 
VALUE FROM FY 2009 TO FY 2010 (2011), available at 
http://www. nacu ho.org/ Documents/rescarch/20 1 0 N CSE_l'ublic_ Tab les_Endowmen t_M 
arket_ Values_Final.pdf. 
83. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, supra note 52. 
81. John Hechinger, When $26 Billion Isn't Enough, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2005, 
at Pl. See also Report Card on Tax Exemptions and Incentives for Higher Education: 
Pass, Fail, or Need Improvement?: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Comm'n on Fin., 
109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Report Card], available at 
http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120506cg.pdf ("It appears that for too many 
colleges and universities, particularly our nation's elite institutions, the response to 
efforts to make college affordable has been a had triple play: big tuition increases; 
expanding endowments; and now million-dollar salaries for college Presidents."). 
85. Report Card, supra note 81. 
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funds.86 During 2009, however, the effects of the recession saw 
university and college endowments lose an average of 18.7% of 
their value.87 The economic setbacks to endowments chilled 
calls for the 5% mandatory payout.ss 
Although the endowment payout argument has been 
shelved for the time being, recent scholarship argues that the 
issue is likely to return as the economy improves in time. 
Alexander Wolf gives five reasons the issue is likely to return: 
(1) the restoration of positive returns by endowment funds 
(e.g., Harvard's endowment gained an 11% return in its 2010 
fiscal year, adding $1.5 billion to its endowment fund); (2) 
tuition has continued to rise at a rate that outpaces inflation, 
(3) a widely cited study lays partial blame of the economic 
crisis on university endowments because they added capital 
and "academic credibility" to risky investment strategies; ( 4) 
another study found that "endowments deviate from their 
stated payout policy during bad times, reducing payout 
rates ... ";89 and (5) recent scrutiny of for-profit education is 
leading commentators to believe that more oversight of the 
nonprofit education sector is forthcoming.90 
b. IRS reaction to mandatory payout discussions and findings 
The IRS created and issued the Endowment section of the 
College and University Questionnaire during the peak of 
discussion concerning the mandatory payout. By the time the 
IRS issued its Interim Report in 2010 concerning the 2006 data 
gathered, it admitted that "[g]iven the fluctuations in the 
financial markets since 2006, the responses to certain 
endowment related questions (e.g., valuation and spending 
86. Wolf, supra note 51, at 591-92. Proposed floors on endowment funds that 
would be affected by a mandatory payout included $500 million and $1 billion. !d. 
87. Press Release, NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments, Press Release 
on the 2009 Endowment Study Results (Jan. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.nacubo.org/Documents/research/2009_NCSE_Press_Release.pdf. 
88. Wolf, supra note 51, at 602. 
89. /d. at 605 n.97 (quoting Jeffrey Brown et al., Why I Lost My Secretary: The 
Effect of Endowment Shocks on University Operations 5 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 15861, Apr. 2010), available at 
www .nber.org/papers/w15861). 
90. Wolf, supra note 51, at 603-05. For a vigorous defense of why the mandatory 
payout should not be implemented, see id. at 605-22. 
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practices) may be significantly different than if based on a 
more recent year."91 Notwithstanding the dated information, a 
few findings are relevant going forward, particularly if the 
issue returns as Mr. Wolf predicts. 
Areas of questioning in the Endowment section of the IRS 
Questionnaire included inquiries regarding endowment assets 
per student ratio, the implementation of target spending rates 
(i.e, what percentage of the endowment assets were targeted to 
be spent each year), whether the organization met its target 
rate, investment policies in place, use of investment 
committees, use of outside consultants, compensation of 
investment managers, a diversification breakdown of fund 
assets (i.e., what percentage of the funds fell into each of the 
following categories: equity funds, real estate, international 
funds, fixed income funds, cash, or alternative investments 
(e.g., hedge funds, private equity, venture capital, etc.)), what 
rate of return was expected (i.e., a metric of how much risk the 
fund managers tolerated), and whether donor restrictions on 
donated assets to the endowment funds were respected and 
monitored.92 
Noteworthy findings by the IRS in its Interim Report 
included the ratio of endowment fund assets to full-time 
equivalent students: large universities had an average of 
$66,000 per student, but a median of a mere $7,000 per 
student.93 The discrepancy suggests that there is significant 
disparity in the asset size in endowment funds among large 
universities-specifically, these numbers suggest a minority 
segment of large universities have extremely large endowment 
funds-per-student in relation to most other universities in the 
large category.94 
91. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1 at 34. 
92. COLLEm; AND UNIVEitSlTY QUESTIONNAIHE, supra note 1, at 20-21. The 
revisl'd Form 990 does ask several annual questions regarding college and university 
endowment funds including whether the organization has an endowment fund, Form 
990, Part IV, beginning and ending balances of the endowment fund for current and 
previous years, and a description of intended uses of the endowment fund, Form 990 
Schedule D, Part V. 
9::3. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 38. 
91. Medium and small institutions' average asset/student ratios are $31,000 and 
$56,000 per student, respectively, and median asset/student ratios are $14,000 and 
$5,000 per student, respectively. /d. 
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Additionally, between 95% and 100% of colleges and 
universities from each category reported that they made 
distributions for scholarships, awards, grants and/or loans from 
their endowment funds. 95 Thus, it is evident that most colleges 
and universities do use endowments to aid students, although, 
neither the questions nor the IRS Interim Report indicated the 
portion or amount of endowment expenses that actually went 
to student aid. 
Probably the most politically poignant finding by the IRS in 
its Interim Report was the target spending rate reported and 
the percentage of organizations that met their self-imposed 
targeted spending rate. The median target spending rates set 
by higher education institutions (the percentage of assets the 
organizations attempt to spend out of their endowments each 
year) were reported at an average of 4.8% for large institutions, 
5.0% for medium institutions, and 5.0% for small institutions.96 
The percentage of organizations that met their target spending 
rate above for 2006 (before the economic crisis) was 89% for 
large institutions, 92% for medium institutions, and 89% for 
small institutions.97 In other words, the vast majority of 
organizations-including large universities-were already 
essentially meeting a near 5% payout anyway, without 
Congressional or IRS mandate. 
c. Arguments surface discouraging mandatory payout 
Although more empirical data over non-recession years 
would be beneficial, the IRS preliminary 2006 payout data of 
roughly 5% at most institutions, coupled with various academic 
defenses offered in Alexander Wolfs article discussed above, 
may cripple the argument to require mandatory payouts of 
endowments. Wolfs arguments98 against the mandatory 
payout include: (1) a mandatory payout would not necessarily 
improve affordability across the higher education sector, but 
may instead subsidize wealthy students who do not need the 
subsidy, (2) wealthy universities are already generous with 
95. Jd. at 48. 
96. ld. at :-39. 
97. ld. 
98. See generally Wolf, supra note 51. 
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their financial aid to underprivileged and middle class 
students, (3) universities do not need additional federal 
oversight since a host of watchdog groups and individuals 
already police a university's use of wealth (including "students, 
prospective students and their parents, faculty and staff, 
alumni, donors, trustees, accrediting agencies, credit rating 
agencies, the media, institutions' local communities, state 
governments, and government agencies like the IRS"), ( 4) 
proponents of the payout make a flawed comparison with 
private foundations that currently require a payout (but are 
fundamentally different because private foundations do not 
have operations), (5) mandatory payouts would constrain a 
university's ability to respond to economic fluctuations, (6) a 
mandatory payout would increase risk to American higher 
education's international strength, and (7) a mandatory payout 
would infringe on the important purpose of free speech.99 
These arguments, coupled with the IRS finding that most 
large universities already spend roughly 5% of their 
endowment in good years may cause efforts to impose 
mandatory payouts to ultimately fade away. 
4. Executive compensation 
Four pillar tests for maintaining tax-exempt statuslOO 
require tax-exempt organizations to: (1) be organized 
exclusively for a charitable purpose, (2) be operated 
primarilylOl for a charitable purpose-including the 
requirement to provide public (and not private) benefits,102 (3) 
99. Free speech has highly protected status at Universities. For example, ,Justice 
Sandra Day O'Conner's wrote in 2003: "[E]xpansive freedoms of speech and thought 
associated with the university environment ... [make universities] a special niche in 
our constitution." (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)). 
100. NICHOLAS P. CAFAIWI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, TAX EXEMPT 
0R(;ANIZATIONS: CASES & MATI~IUALS 113-14 (2003). See also JAMES J. FISHMAN & 
STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 
97-99 (2nd ed. 2006). 
101. Although the statute uses the term "exclusively" when providing the 
operational test, Treas. ]{eg. 1.501 (c)(3)-1 (c)(l) asserts that "exclusively" means 
operated "primarily" for exempt purposes. 
102. CAFAIWI & CHERRY, supra note 100, at 1-13 ("In your studies of tax-exempt 
organizations do not assume that private benefit and private inurement are the same 
thing. They are not. Exempt organizations that confer benefits on those in control of 
the organization (an overlap of control and benefit) are in violation of the private 
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not allow private inurement, and (4) meet specific limitations 
on lobbying and political activities. Specifically, the private 
inurement prohibition was designed "to prevent anyone in a 
position to do so from siphoning off any of a charity's income or 
assets for personal use."103 
Historically, a single violation of private inurement would 
allow the IRS to revoke tax exempt status for the entire 
organization.104 However, the 1996 passage of the intermediate 
sanctions rules gave the IRS an additional enforcement tool 
that represented "the most dramatic and important package of 
federal statutory tax law rules concerning tax-exempt 
organizations since enactment of the basic statutory structure 
of the exempt organizations field in 1969."105 
a. Intermediate sanctions 
The intermediate sanction rules impose a penalty excise tax 
when the tax exempt organization engages in an "excess 
benefit transaction," a transaction in which (1) a direct or 
indirect economic benefit is provided to an organization insider, 
and (2) the economic benefit provided exceeds the value (if any) 
of consideration received by the organization.106 As discussed 
above, a common excess benefit transaction would be an 
executive or director that is compensated above fair market 
inurement test. Those exempt organizations that confer a benefit on too small a group 
of beneficiaries (independent of those who control the organization) have conferred a 
private, not public, benefit and are in violation of the operational test, i.e. they are 
engaging in a non-exempt activity."). 
103. HARDING, supra note 6, at 2::35 (quoting GCM a9862 (Dec. 2, 1991)). 
104. See, e.ft., Andote Psychiatric Ctr., Inc. v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1998-27:3, 76 
T.C.M. 175 at *8 (1998) ("The presence of a single substantial nonexempt purpose 
destroys the exemption regardless of the number or importance of the exempt 
purposes."). See also HARDING, supra note 6, at 2::31 (stating that it is possible to have 
tax exempt status revoked for violations of the private inurement rules, however, "it 
would be quite unusual for the IRS to attempt to revoke a major educational 
institution's tax-exempt status for such violations, unless there was a continuous 
pattern of violations and the institution refused to change its ways or cooperate with 
the ll:{S.''). 
105. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 548. See also id. at 565 n.l52 ("The lawyers for 
the IRS wrote that the primary purpose of the intermediate sanctions rules is to 
'require insiders who are receiving excess benefits to make their exempt organizations 
whole, with the goal of keeping them operating for the benefit of the public."' (quoting 
Chief Counsel Adv. Mem. 200431023)). 
106. HARDING, supra note 6, at 212. 
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value for his services. Although excess benefit transactions 
may include excessive compensation, they may also include any 
other benefit to the insider such as below-market sales, loans, 
or lease transactions.107 In addition to excise tax penalties 
assessed on the benefit received above market, the insider 
must also correct the excess benefit by restoring the value of 
the benefit back to organization, often by paying an equivalent 
amount of cash back to the exempt organization. lOS 
The excise tax penalties in this area of law are termed 
"intermediate sanctions" because they are middle-ground 
penalties-not so severe as to revoke an organization's exempt 
status and not so light that the IRS simply ignores the 
violation of law: 
[W]hen the IRS determines that a form of private inurement 
has occurred, [the assessment of excise taxes] stand between 
the two extremes of the absence of action by the agency (other 
than perhaps an examination and warning) and revocation of 
the tax-exempt status of the organization (often with the 
principal impact of harming the organization's programs and 
beneficiaries) .1 09 
The excise tax is 25% of the excess benefit and is levied 
against the individual receiving the excess benefit-not the 
organization.llO Intermediate sanctions may also require 
complicit managers in the organization to pay an excise tax of 
10% of the excess benefit.lll For organizations that do not 
report the improper transactions before the IRS discovers 
them, the excise tax rate assessed is 200% of the excess benefit 
(again levied against the organization insider).112 In extreme 
cases, where multiple excess benefit transactions occur within 
an organization, the IRS may bypass the intermediate sanction 
rules altogether and simply revoke the tax exempt status of the 
entire organization.113 
107. /d. 
108. I.R.C. §1958(1)(6); HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 565. 
109. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 548. 
110. l.R.C. §4958(a)(l). 
111. I.R.C. §1958(a)(2). 
112. I.R.C. §1958(b). 
11:1. See Caracci v. Comm'r, 118 T.C. 379, 414-17 (2002) (reu'd on other grounds 
156 F. :3d 111 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Although the imposition of section 4958 excise taxes as a 
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It is important to note that state colleges and universities 
that qualify for tax exemption under IRC §115 are not subject 
to intermediate sanction provisiOns as the intermediate 
sanctions only apply to 501(c)(3) organizations.114 The IRS has 
taken the position that schools that are exempt under § 115 are 
not subject to the intermediate sanction rules even if they have 
also sought and obtained tax-exemption under §501(c)(3).115 
Therefore, the questions related to intermediate sanctions on 
the IRS College and University Questionnaire applied typically 
to private colleges and universities only. 
b. Rebuttable presumption of excess benefit 
The analysis of whether intermediate sanctions apply in a 
specific transaction necessarily pivots on whether the benefit-
such as compensation received by an officer or director-was 
excessive.116 The intermediate sanction rules provide for a 
"rebuttable presumption of reasonableness."l17 In other words, 
result of an excess benefit transaction docs not preclude revocation of the 
organization's tax-exempt status, the legislative history indicates that both a 
revocation and the imposition of intermediate sanctions will he an unusual case."). 
111. Temp. Treas. Reg.§ 53.4958-2(a)(1); HARDING, supra note 6, at 21:3; INTERIM 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 60. 
115. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 60. 
116. Bertrand Harding notes that "[tjo the extent that a college or university 
might encounter a private inurement problem, it will most likely arise in the context of 
unreasonable compensation payments made to an officer, director, or trustee, or some 
type of 'sweetheart deal' entered into between the school and one of these 
individuals .... With respect to potential 'sweetheart arrangements' between colleges 
and university and an officer, director, or trustee, the possibilities arc virtually endless. 
They could involve rental arrangements in which a school rents property from the 
individual at more than fair market value or leases property to the individual at less 
than fair market value. Or they could involve loan arrangements whereby the school 
loans funds to the individual at less than a fair market value interest rate or borrows 
funds from an individual at greater than a fair market value interest rate. Also, if the 
loan is not repaid in a timely fashion, there is the possibility of a private inurement. In 
one case, a school's tax exemption was revoked, in part, because the school provided 
two of its officers with interest-free and unsecured loans that, according to the court, 
subjected the school to uncompensated risk for no business purposes." HARDINO, supra 
note 6, at XXX. See Best Lock Corp. v. Comm'r, 31 T.C. 1217 (1959); Hev. Rul. 67-5, 
1967-1 C.B. 123; John Marshall Law Sch. v. United States, 1981 WL 11168, at 3 (Ct. 
Cl. 1981). 
117. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 562 n.126 (The "rebuttable presumption is not 
provided for in the Internal Revenue Code; it was created by the legislative history (H. 
Rep. 104-506, 101th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 (1996)) and is reflected in and amplified by 
the regulations (Heg. § 58.4958-6)."). 
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organizations can get to a pseudo-safe harbor that the 
compensation they pay must be presumed to be reasonable by 
the courts if they meet several baseline requirements-most 
importantly, the comparability data. The presumption is 
rebuttable because even if the organization meets its baseline 
requirements, the IRS can still prove unreasonableness if "the 
IRS develops sufficient contrary evidence to rebut the probative 
value of the comparability data relied on by the authorized 
governing body."118 In other words, the IRS has a significantly 
higher burden of proving that compensation or a benefit 
received by an insider is above fair market value. Therefore, 
when the organization meets the rebuttable presumption, the 
IRS is less likely to pursue intermediate sanction due to the 
greater resources it would require to prosecute and the higher 
risk that it will lose in litigation.119 
So what baseline elements must be met by the organization 
to receive a presumption of reasonableness in its compensation 
practices? Compensation payment (and similar transactions) 
are considered reasonable-and therefore not an excise benefit 
transaction subject to intermediate sanctions-if: (1) the 
transaction was approved by an independent body (e.g., an 
independent board of directors or trustees) to review and 
establish the amount of compensation in advance of actual 
payment, (2) the transaction involved use of appropriate 
comparability data, and (3) the transaction involved 
appropriate contemporaneous documentation of the process 
used to establish the compensation amount.l20 
The foregoing discussion of intermediate sanctions and 
rebuttable presumption rules illuminate the motivation behind 
IRS strategy in this area. The IRS is most likely to target 
private colleges and universities with the following 
characteristics: (1) the appearance of excessive compensation or 
suspicious insider transactions, and (2) a lack of policies to 
ensure the intermediate sanctions rebuttable presumption is in 
118. HOPKINS, supra note 17, at 564. 
119. Examples of where the IRS may still overcome the rehuttahle presumption 
necessitate highly persuasive facts, such as where "the compensation data relied on by 
the parties was not for functionally comparable positions or ... the disqualified person 
in fact did not substantially perform the responsibilities of the position." Id. 
120. /d. at 562-63; INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 60 (emphasis added). 
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place. Organizations fitting such a profile are clearly low 
hanging fruit for the Service in its search for transactions in 
which to apply intermediate sanction excise taxes. Thus, it 
behooves colleges and universities to have rebuttable 
presumption procedures in place. 
c. IRS scrutiny of colleges & universities that lack the rebuttable 
presumption 
Some of the most key questions m the Executive 
Compensation portion of the Colleges and Universities 
Questionnaire point to the strategy mentioned above. The IRS 
Interim Report itself discussed this motivation: "A principal 
focus of the college and university study is to gather a better 
understanding of how organizations use the rebuttable 
presumption procedure and other governance practices in 
setting compensation."121 
Private institutions were asked whether the institutions 
used "a process intended to satisfy the rebuttable presumption 
procedure of [IRC §] 4958 to determine [compensation] ."122 Of 
the institutions that responded, 45% of small, 29% of medium, 
121. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1, at 59-60. The report goes on to explain that 
"[s]ection 4958, the intermediate sanction on excess benefit transactions, provides that 
an excess benefit transaction occurs when a disqualified person (any person in a 
position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the tax-exempt 
organization) receives an economic benefit from an exempt organization that exceeds 
the value of consideration received by the organization. In addition to or in lieu of 
revoking the charity's tax-exempt status, section 4958 imposes an excise tax against 
the disqualified person and possibly the organization manager. The section 4958 
regulations provide a rebuttable presumption process that public charities may (hut 
are not required to) use when establishing what appropriate compensation is for a 
disqualified person [Treas. Reg. §53.4958-6]. This process involves three criteria-an 
independent body to review and establish the amount of compensation in advance of 
actual payment, use of appropriate comparability data to establish the compensation, 
and contemporaneous documentation of the process used to establish the compensation 
in the particular instance. Under the regulations, compensation determined pursuant 
to a process that satisfies the rebuttable presumption requirements is presumed to he 
reasonable in amount, and the IRS has the burden of proving that the compensation is 
excessive for section 4958 excess benefit transaction tax purposes. If the rebuttable 
presumption is not met, the burden is on the organization to prove that the 
compensation is reasonable .... Public colleges and universities are not subject to the 
provisions of section 4958; therefore, they were instructed not to complete this portion 
of the questionnaire. To the extent public organizations responded to these questions, 
their responses were not included in the results." !d. at 60. 
122. Jd. at 62. 
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and 38% of large institutions reported not using rebuttable 
presumption procedures for any of their six highest paid 
officers, directors, trustees, or key employees.123 The IRS also 
asked follow-up questions regarding the specific elements of 
the rebuttable presumption, documentation, approval process, 
and use of comparable data.124 
Documentation. The IRS asked whether the organization 
had documented the basis for setting compensation for each of 
the six highest paid ODTKEs.125 Over 85% of medium 
institutions reported documenting the basis for setting 
compensation prior to paying compensation for at least one of 
their six highest paid ODTKEs.126 Approximately 74% of small 
institutions reported the same. 
Independent Approval Process. Over 85% of medium 
institutions and 97% of small institutions reported approval of 
compensation by an independent governing body for at least 
one of their six highest paid ODTKEs.127 
Use of Comparable Data. Only 63% of large institutions, 
79% of medium institutions and 59% of small institutions 
reported using an independent compensation comparability 
survey when setting compensation for at least one of their six 
highest paid ODTKEs.12S The IRS noted in its report that 
investigating the use of comparability data in setting 
compensation "is an area of continued focus for the IRS."129 
Obviously, the IRS understands that a significant portion of 
colleges and universities are not putting policies in place that 
12:1. /d. at 6::3. "Key Employee,"' for purposes of the Questionnaire, was defined as 
"an employee of the organization (other than an officer, director, or trustee) who has 
responsibilities, powers or influence over the organization similar to those of officers, 
directors, or trustees. Key employees include the chief management and administrative 
officials of an organization (such as an executive director or chancellor). A chief 
financial officer and the officer in charge of administration or program operations are 
key employees if they have the authority to control the organization's activities, or its 
finances." ld. at 51 n.2-1. 
124. /d. at 62. 
125. /d. 
126. !d. at 6:3. The sample size of large institutions for this question was too small 
to he reported without creating a risk that the identity of the respondents would be 
revealed. /d. 
127. /d. at 64. 
128. /d. 
129. ld. 
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protect them from charges of excess benefit transactions for 
many of their highly compensated officers, directors, and key 
employees. 
Additionally, in its scrutiny of excessive compensation, the 
IRS looks beyond mere base salary of these managers and 
directors. The service requested information on 22 non-salary 
types of compensation in its Questionnaire.130 The most 
commonly reported non-salary types of compensation included 
contributions to employee benefit plans; contributions to life, 
disability, and long-term care insurance; the value of 
organization provided housing and utilities; and personal use of 
organization vehicles.l31 
It is clear the IRS is keenly interested in the compensation 
of highly paid college and university individuals. This focus 
should alert colleges and universities to the importance of 
understanding the intricacies of the intermediate sanctions 
rules as they set compensation for their highest paid personnel. 
A leading scholar and practitioner in the field recently 
predicted: 
The coming . . . years will bring interpretations and 
amplifications of the intermediate sanctions rules, with 
emphasis on what does and does not constitute an excess 
benefit transaction . . . . [T]his process will draw heavily on 
existing law as shaped by the private inurement doctrine .... 
The intermediate sanctions rules probably will be invoked 
more frequently than revocation of tax-exempt status by 
application of the private inurement doctrine to public 
130. Aside from an individual's base salary, the IRS requested whether the IRS 
paid the following types of compensation to at least one of its six highest paid ODTKEs: 
bonuses, contributions to employee benefit plans, incentives, contributions to life, 
disability, and long-term care insurance, split-dollar life insurance, forgiveness of debt 
or interest on loans or credit extensions, stock or stock options, severance or change of 
control payments, personal use of organization credit cards, personal use of 
organization vehicles, personal travel for the person or family members, expense 
reimbursement under non-accountable plans, value of organization provided housing 
and utilities, value of organization provided vacation home, personal services provided 
at person's residence (e.g., housekeeper, lawn service, etc.), other personal services 
provided, health or social club dues, personal use of organization owned aircraft or 
boat, first-class travel, taxable scholarship and fellowship grants, other (non-IRC §132) 
fringe benefits, and any other form of compensation. I d. at 57. 
131. Id. 
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charities .... 1:32 
Colleges and universities should continue to improve their 
vigilance of tax and governance issues in the years ahead. They 
will be most efficient in that process by anticipating the 
direction and focus of the IRS in its monitoring and 
enforcement activities discussed above. Such anticipation will 
thereby allow colleges and universities to reduce compliance 
risk by avoiding IRS-imposed intermediate sanction excise 
taxes and defending its treatment of its potentially unrelated 
business income activities. Additionally, colleges and 
universities will also be able to reduce audit risk by 
implementing, improving, and reviewing specifically 
scrutinized governance policies and practices. 
IV. CRITICISM OF EXPANDED IRS ACTIVITY 
Critics of recent increased IRS activity in the nonprofit 
sector note three overarching concerns: (A) an increased 
compliance costs for tax-exempt organizations, (B) the IRS 
exceeding its statutory and judicial boundaries of audit 
authority, and (C) constitutional concerns over stealth 
preemption resulting from unilateral IRS action. Most of these 
concerns address new reporting burdens about governance 
policies and practices for tax-exempt organizations generally; 
however, these concerns also apply specifically to higher 
education institutions. 
A. Compliance Cost Concern 
Higher reporting burdens place strain on already scarce 
charitable organization resources-resources that would 
otherwise help public beneficiaries of the charity. Areas 
requiring the greatest burden are the resources that nonprofit 
organizations-including colleges and universities-must 
spend on changes to the new Form 990. Because of the many 
changes on the form introduced in 2008, the IRS phased the 
form in over three years.l33 Nonprofit scholar James J. 
Fishman notes that: 
1:32. THOMAS K. HYATT & BRUCE H. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT 
H F:ALTHCARE 0RCANIZATIONS 119 (8d ed., 2008). 
13il. Fishman, supra note 1 il, at 561 (201 0). 
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One should not forget that disclosure comes with a cost to 
comply with new demands, borne by the organization. Every 
additional cost in time and money diverts the organization's 
human and financial resources away from achieving its 
charitable mission .... The Form 990 ... has morphed into a 
legal, fundraising and public relations statement that 
requires professional assistance from lawyers, development 
advisors, and public relations personnel [thereby distorting 
an organization's charitable energy].l34 
Notably, the 2007 Form 990 Instructions estimated that the 
typical reporting burden for Form 990 and its schedules 
(including record keeping, learning about the law or form, 
preparing the form, etc.) took 261.4 hours to complete.l35 The 
instructions to the 2008, 2009, and 2010 Forms 990 and their 
accompanying schedules estimated a typical reporting burden 
of 497.4 hours for the same activities.l36 Clearly, the cost of 
compliance is diverting resources from charitable purposes. 
The IRS argues that this burden is justified in the name of 
transparency and public confidence. Some scholars dispute 
whether empirical evidence agrees with the IRS' bureaucratic 
approach.l37 Ultimately, in the absence of congressional or 
judicial oversight, the IRS will continue to prevail in its 
justified burden argument. 
B. IRS Exceeding Statutory and Judicial Boundaries of Audit 
Authority Concern 
The second concern involves the method by which the IRS 
asserts its authority to request certain information such as its 
governance questions on the Form 990, or the governance and 
endowment questions on the IRS College and University 
Questionnaire. Many of the Form 990's new governance 
questions are not required by statute by the IRS's own 
134. Id. at 589. 
135. 2007 IRS Instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ, at 65. 
136. 2008 Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt From 
Income Tax, at 40; 2009 Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt 
From Income Tax, at 42; 2010 Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization 
Exempt From Income Tax, at 16. 
137. Fishman, supra note 13, at 572; Kathleen M. Boozang, Does an Independent 
Board Improve Nonprofit Corporate Governance?, 75 TENN. L. REV. 8:3, 1 :l6 (2007). 
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admission.138 Nor was a statute created allowing the IRS to 
ask questions concerning governance and endowment funds on 
its Questionnaire. But organizations that failed to fully 
complete the Questionnaire were referred for audit by the 
IRS.1:39 
Additionally, the Form 990 Instructions state that its 
governance section must be filled out in its entirety for the 
form to be considered complete and accurate.140 When an 
organization's executive signs the return, she signs under 
penalties of perjury that the return is complete and 
accurate.141 Thus, if any questions in the governance section 
are left unanswered by an exempt organization-including 
colleges and universities-the return is deemed incomplete and 
the signer would presumably be subject to perjury penalties. 
Worse, the failure to file a complete and accurate informational 
return can also lead to tax-exempt status revocation for the 
entire organization as a violation of IRC §6033(b), which 
requires most tax-exempt organizations to file information "the 
Secretary may by forms or regulations prescribe."142 Clearly, 
1::38. 2008 Form 990, 6. The title of Page 6 of the Form 990 states: "Governance, 
Management, and Disclosure (Sections A, B, and C request information about policies 
not required by the Internal Revenue Code.") Notably, the parenthetical letting tax 
filers know the governance section questions are not required by the Internal Revenue 
Code was removed from the main heading and moved to a wbheading in the 2009 and 
2010 versions of Form 990. On September 8, 2011, the treasury department issued 
finalized regulations it reported as necessary to implement the redesigned Form 990. 
T.D. 9519, Returns by Exempt Organizations-Revised Form 990. Although the 
finalized regulations address many areas of the form that have changed in recent 
years, including reporting issues concerning compensation, the finalized regulations do 
not specifically address the governance section of the Form 990. 
1:19. INTEI\IM REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
110. 2010 Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt From 
Income Tax, 18 ("Although federal tax law generally does not mandate particular 
management structures, operational policies, or administrative practices, every 
organization is required to answer each question in Part VI. For example, all 
organizations must answer lines 11 and 11a, which ask about the organization's 
process, if any, it uses to review Form 990, even though the governing body is not 
required by federal tax law to review Form 990.") (emphasis added). 
141. The officer's signature block for the Form 990 states: "Under penalties of 
perjury, l declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules 
and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct, and 
complete." 2010 Form 990, at 1 (emphasis added). 
112. IHC §60::J:1(b). See also Rev. Rul. 59-95, 1959-1 CB 627 (holding that the 
"failure or inability to file the required information return or otherwise to comply with 
the provision[sj of section 60il:l of the Code and the regulations which implement it, 
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the IRS is extending its audit power to solicit new information 
from colleges and universities that does not have a direct basis 
in statute. 
1. IRS audit power authority 
The IRS has broad authority to request information in 
determining tax liability of an organization-but the authority 
does have limits. IRC §7602(a)(l)-(2) authorizes the IRS "[t]o 
examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may 
be relevant or material to such inquiry" and to summon 
individuals to produce such materials. A check on this power is 
given in IRC §7605(b), which provides that "[n]o taxpayer shall 
be subjected to unnecessary examination or investigations." 
Commentary by Marcus Owens notes that the IRS is acutely 
aware that at some point there is a limit on its ability to compel 
information.l43 Owens notes two areas where analysis of the 
limit has surfaced: summons enforcement and incomplete 
return penalties.l44 
Regarding summons enforcement, the courts have at times 
refused to enforce summonses against taxpayers on the basis of 
irrelevance under U.S. v. Powell.l45 The Powell rule requires 
that the IRS must demonstrate "that the information requested 
'may be relevant' or 'may shed light on' a potential tax 
liability."l46 Owens concludes that a charity's governance 
policies and procedures do not appear to meet the Powell 
requirement of relevancy to a potential tax liability.l47 
Additionally, two General Counsel Memoranda ('GCM") 
addressing limits on IRS information gathering power are 
telling and discussed below. 
may result in the termination of the exempt status of an organization previously held 
exempt, on the grounds that the organization has not established that it is observing 
the conditions required for the continuation of an exempt status."). 
113. Marcus S. Owens, Charities and Governance: Is the IRS Subject to 
Challenge?, 119 Tax Notes 613 (2008). 
141. /d. 
145. 379 U.S. 18, 57-58 (1961). 
146. Owens, supra note 113. 
147. /d. 
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2. Governance questions are not necessary for the 
administration of tax law 
A 1975 GCM involved IRS chief counsel considering the 
consequences of omission of some information by a tax-exempt 
organization on its Form 990.148 The chief counsel observed: 
[l]f the material required and requested, but unsupplied, in 
those forms was material and thus necessary for the proper 
administration of the tax laws, then any failure to include 
such information on those forms, without reasonable cause, 
would subject the taxpayer to the penalty provided .... It 
should be pointed out that if the materiality of these items is 
questioned by a taxpayer or subsequently made the subject of 
litigation, the Service should be prepared to substantiate why 
it considers such items to be material.149 
Thus, one path that may lead to prevailing against the IRS 
for the failure to answer governance questions not required by 
federal statute would be an argument that they are not 
material or necessary for the proper administration of the tax 
laws, but are-as the IRS has recently admitted in a relevant 
speech-merely an "aid" to understand principles that "derive 
from the requirements for tax exemption."150 In other words, 
because the governance questions are not tied directly to tax 
statute, but are distant derivations of tax statute, answers to 
governance questions may not be required. 
3. IRC §6033 was never intended by congress to apply to 
governance practices of tax-exempt organizations 
A 1980 GCM indicates that IRC §6033-the section that 
grants the IRS broad authority to design returns to collect 
information for the "purpose of carrying out the internal 
revenue laws"-was never envisioned by Congress to elicit 
information from exempt organizations that might relate to a 
wagering excise tax.151 By analogy, it can be argued that the 
IRS, by its own admission, should construe IRC§6033 narrowly 
in such a way that if Congress did not envision use of §6033 to 
148. GCM 36506 (Dec. 8, 1975). 
119. !d. (emphasis added). 
150. Ingram, supra note 20, at 3 (emphasis added). 
151. Owens, supra note 113 (quoting GCM 38382 (May 23, 1980)). 
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apply to tax exempt organization governance, then the IRS 
would exceed its authority by requesting such information. 
Ultimately, Owens believes a clear argument can be made that 
the IRS exceeded its audit authority by soliciting information 
that is not required by the Internal Revenue Code: "[I]t appears 
that this situation is truly unprecedented and that a 
challenge ... would potentially be successful."152 
IRS use of broadly granted discretion to threaten perjury 
and tax-exempt status revocation in order to implement new 
governance reporting-instead of administering reporting 
requirements mandated by Congressional statute-is 
somewhat disconcerting.153 However, because of the uncertain 
limit of regulatory powers granted to the IRS in this area, and 
a lack of actual litigants by tax-exempt entities, the governance 
questions are likely here to stay unless or until they are 
actually challenged. 
C. Stealth Preemption Constitutionality Concern 
In addition to statutory boundary concerns regarding recent 
IRS extension into the governance areas, there are 
constitutional concerns as well. James Fishman argues that 
IRS regulation of nonprofit corporate governance is a type of 
stealth preemption that undermines the principles of the 
nation's federalist system, and is "at least one degree separated 
from traditional constitutional analysis."154 He remarks: 
Stealth preemption refers to a process by which a federal 
agency or departmental regulator supersedes state or local 
officials or imposes legal rules that historically have been 
matters of state law .... The question is not whether good 
governance is desirable. Of course it is. But, has the Service 
identified appropriate indicators of that behavior, and does 
the Service have the authority and expertise to demand such 
152. Owens, supra note 143, at 6. Owens also notes that "[tjhe executive branch 
functions-IRS Chief Counsel, the Treasury Department, and the Office of 
Management and Budget-that would traditionally operate to prevent such 
overstepping by the tax administrator have not acted, whether merely out of 
inattention to or perhaps in complicity with the Service's unilateral expansion of its 
authority." Td. at 5. 
15:). Included in the concern is the broad precedent these actions set for IRS 
authority. 
151. Fishman, supra note 1:1, at 519. 
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steps as it recommends?155 
Fishman notes that the American political system's major 
20th century development was the growth of federal power-
particularly federal administrative action-at the expense of 
traditional state authority.156 He writes: 
The formal theory of federalism posits that our political 
system places limits on congressional action through states' 
representation in Congress, and the procedural safeguards 
that function through each state's constituency to restrain the 
ability of the federal government to reach beyond its 
powers .... Federalism provides citizens the opportunity to 
make an impact on government at a local level, helping to 
make it more responsive to the immediate needs and evolving 
values of individual communities, and less susceptible to 
bureaucratic inertia that exists on the federallevel.157 
In other words, limits are constitutionally in place to check 
increased federal power crowding out the ability of the 
individual citizens to influence local issues and values. 
The IRS has lightly addressed this concern. IRS TE/G E 
Commissioner Sarah Ingram observed in a June 2009 speech 
that "we wondered if [the states] might see our work as a raid 
on their authority and jurisdiction, an overstepping of bounds 
on our part. But by and large that did not happen."158 But 
Fishman explains that the Pension Protection Act of 2006 
allowed increased cooperation between state charity regulators 
and the IRS, enabling state regulators to request IRS tax 
information to help prosecute misconduct with fewer 
resources.159 Fishman observes that "[t]his may explain the 
reluctance to criticize the Service. One cannot expect [state] 
attorneys general to bite the hand that feeds them 
155. ld. at 519, 561. Fishman separates some areas of current IRS scrutiny from 
others. He notes that questions that related din~ctly to tax compliance and ensure 
compliance with the Internal Revenue Code arc appropriate, such as questions in the 
Form 990 concerning excess benefit transactions. Other questions, he argues, arc 
attenuated from tax law compliance, including questions concerning independence of 
directors, conflicts of interest, and disclosure policies of governance practices. !d. at 
567·68. 
156. /d. at 578. 
157. Id. at 580. 
158. Ingram, supra note 20, at 7. 
159. Fishman, supra note 13, at 578·88. 
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evidence."160 
Fishman asserts the Service's lack of concern regarding its 
inappropriate preemption should not come as a surprise; he 
quotes Thomas Merrill, observing: 
Agencies are specialized institutions, intensely focused on the 
details of the particular statutory regimes they are charged 
with administering. By design and tradition, they are not 
expected to ponder larger structural issues such as the 
relative balance of authority between the federal and state 
governments, the importance of preserving state autonomy, 
the value of allowing policy to vary in accordance with local 
conditions, or the systemic advantages of permitting state 
experimentation with divergent approaches to social 
problems.161 
In other words, agencies by nature have a narrow focus: 
their own policy goals trump larger issues of balanced 
government. Fishman closes his stealth preemption reasoning 
by noting that cases such as Chevron and Skidmore protect 
agency-made rules only where the rules were either 
promulgated by an applicable statute, or where the rules relied 
on the agency's expertise.162 Fishman deftly points out that the 
IRS itself admits that many of its governance questions on the 
Form 990163-rules required under penalties of perjury and 
potential revocation of exemption status-have no substantive 
basis in statute. Additionally, it can be argued persuasively 
that the IRS has no expertise or experience in good corporate 
governance .164 
160. Id. at 588. 
161. Id. at 581 (quoting Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: 
'Agency Forcing' Measures, 58 Duke 
L .• J. 2125, 2147 (2009)). 
162. Fishman, supra note 1 a, at 5sa.s6. 
16a. The IRS would also presumably admit that governance and endowment fund 
questions have no substantive based in statute (although the College and Education 
Questionnaire did not subject the organization's singing executives to perjury, however, 
as had been mentioned above, failure to answer the questions did automatically subject 
such organizations to automatic audit by the IRS-an event that potentially can open 
organizations up to risk of lost exemption status). 
161. Fishman, supra note 13, at 586 (arguing that any experience the IRS has in 
governance is "based on anecdotal evidence or the opinions of nongovernmental 
experts, rather than any empirical basis of a link between good governance and tax 
compliance."). 
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D. Looking Forward 
In the face of the legal criticisms offered above, there is no 
question the IRS has received substantial compliance in both 
the annual Form 990 compliance area and the College and 
University Questionnaire. Without litigation concerning the 
merits of IRS action, or increased oversight from Congress, it is 
likely the IRS will continue its unilateral quest for 
transparency in the nonprofit sector generally and higher 
education specifically, unbridled and without boundary beyond 
its own good conscience. 
In its May 2010 College and University Interim Report, the 
IRS discussed its anticipation of issuing a final report that 
would provide more detailed analysis on information gathered 
from the College and University Questionnaire. On October 6, 
2011, Congressman Boustany, Chairman of the Subcommittee 
of Oversight on the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, 
requested an update from the IRS on its progress regarding the 
Final Report.165 The IRS has recently reported it still 
anticipates releasing a final report on Colleges and 
Universities sometime after it has completed its current 30-
plus College and University audits; however, no firm 
timeframe has been offered on when the report will be 
released.166 
V. CONCLUSION 
College and university tax exemption benefits invite an 
opening of the door for some transparency, but how wide that 
door should swing is an open question. The IRS has clearly 
pushed in recent years for more transparency, and, in the 
absence of significant challenge, has created considerable 
reporting hurdles for colleges and universities. These hurdles 
increase compliance costs and amplify audit and compliance 
risk. 
As colleges and universities heed signals from the IRS 
165. Letter from Suhcomm. on Oversight Chairman Charles W. l3oustany to 
Comm'r Douglas H. Shulman (Oct. 6, 2011), available at 
http:/ /waysandmeans.house. gov/U ploadedFiles/Tax -exempt. Oct_ 6.ll_Redacted. pdf. 
166. IRS, EXEMPT 0RGANIZA1'IONS 2011 ANNUAL REPORT & 2012 WORK PLAN 10, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/puh/irs-tege/fy2012_eo_ work_plan_20ll_annrpt.pdf. 
256 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2012 
regarding areas of future scrutiny, they will be able to reduce 
audit risk by avoiding the reporting of outlying data. Avoiding 
such outlying data will reduce the chances of IRS audit. 
Additionally, colleges and universities can reduce their 
compliance risk-and the associated penalties of 
noncompliance-as they and their advisors attain more expert 
comprehension of the law itself and the policies currently 
driving the discussion. 
